Whether such circularity is as unacceptable as a p-therefore-p inference is an open question. Moreover, theavoidance of circularity does not come cheap.
Experientialfoundationalists claim that perception is a source of justification. Hence they need to answer the J-question: Why is perception asource of justification? As we saw above, if we wish to answer thisquestion without committing ourselves to the kind of circularitydependence coherentism involves, we must choose between externalism andan appeal to brute necessity.
Neither choice is unproblematic. The second weakness of the regress argument is that its conclusionmerely says this: If there are justified beliefs, there must bejustified beliefs that do not receive their justification from otherbeliefs.
Its conclusion does not say that, if there are justifiedbeliefs, there must be beliefs whose justification is independent ofany justification for further beliefs. So the regress argument, if itwere sound, would merely show that there must be doxastic basicality.
Dependence coherentism, however, allows for doxasticbasicality. So the regress argument merely defends experientialfoundationalism against doxastic coherentism. It does not tell us whywe should prefer independence foundationalism to dependencecoherentism. Experiential foundationalism can be supported by citing cases likethe blue hat example. Such examples make it plausible to assume thatperceptual experiences are a source of justification.
But they do notarbitrate between dependence coherentism and independencefoundationalism, since either one of these views appeals to perceptualexperiences to explain why perceptual beliefs are justified. Finally, foundationalism can be supported by advancing objections tocoherentism. One prominent objection is that coherentism somehow failsto ensure that a justified belief system is in contact with reality. This objection derives its force from the fact that fiction can beperfectly coherent.
Why think, therefore, that a belief system'scoherence is a reason for thinking that the belief in that system tendto be true? This looks like an effective response to the no-contact-with-realityobjection. Moreover, it is not easy to see why foundationalism itselfshould be better positioned than coherentism when contact with realityis the issue. Iffoundationalists expect a logical guarantee of such contact,basic beliefs must be infallible.
That would make contact with realitya rather expensive commodity. Given its price, foundationalists mightwant to lower their expectations. According to an alternativeconstrual, we expect merely the likelihood of contact withreality.
But if coherentists account for the importance of perceptionin one way or another, they can meet that expectation as well asfoundationalists. Since coherentism can be construed in different ways, it is unlikelythat there is one single objection that succeeds in refuting allpossible versions of coherentism.
Doxastic coherentism, however, seemsparticularly vulnerable to criticism coming from the foundationalistcamp. One of these we considered already: It would seem that doxasticcoherentism makes excessive intellectual demands on believers. According to a secondobjection, doxastic coherentism fails by being insensitive to theepistemic relevance of perceptual experiences.
Foundationalists couldargue as follows. Suppose Kim is observing a chameleon that rapidlychanges its colors. Her belief is now unjustified because shebelieves the chameleon is blue even though it looks purple toher. Then the chameleon changes its color back to blue.
Now Kim'sbelief that the chameleon is blue is justified again because thechameleon once again looks blue to her. Coherentism is typically defended by attacking foundationalism as aviable alternative. To argue against privilege foundationalism,coherentists pick an epistemic privilege they think is essential tofoundationalism, and then argue that either no beliefs, or too fewbeliefs, enjoy such a privilege.
Against experiential foundationalism,different objections have been advanced. Therefore, therelation between a perceptual belief and the perceptual experience thatgives rise to it can only be causal.
Consider again, however, the hatexample from above. It wouldseem it does. If it does, there seems to be no reason to deny that yourperceptual experience can play a justificatory role. Another line of thought is that, if perceptual experiences havepropositional content, they cannot stop the justificatory regressbecause they would then be in need of justification themselves. That,however, appears to be a strange thought. In our actual epistemicpractice, we never demand of others to justify the way things appear tothem in their perceptual experiences.
Indeed, such a demand would seemabsurd. Suppose I ask you: 'Why do you think that the hat is blue? For instance, I might ask: 'Why doyou think its looking blue to you gives you a reason for thinking it isblue? After all, we can reasonably doubt that introspectivebeliefs about how things appear to us are infallible. But now suppose Iask you: 'Why do you suppose the perceptual experience in which the hatlooks blue to you is justified? Imight as well ask you what it is that justifies your headache when youhave one, or what justifies the itch in your nose when you have one.
The latter questions, you should reply, would be as absurd as myrequest for stating a justifying reason for your perceptual experience. Experiential foundationalism, then, is not easily dislodged. On whatgrounds could coherentists object to it? To raise problems forexperiential foundationalism, coherentists could press the J-question:Why are perceptual experiences a source of justification?
Iffoundationalists answer the J-question appealing to evidence thatwarrants the attribution of reliability to perceptual experiences,experiential foundationalism morphs into dependence coherentism, or, aswe have called it, the compromise position.
To avoid this outcome,foundationalists would have to give an alternative answer. One way ofdoing this would be to advocate independence foundationalism, whichadopts the epistemic conception of basicality and views it as a matterof brute necessity that perception is a source of justification.
Soultimately, the task of defending coherentism might come down to thetask of showing that dependence coherentism as a compromise position ispreferable to independence foundationalism. To back up such apreference, it might be argued that dependence coherentism gives us amore satisfying answer to the J-question than independencefoundationalism does. But is that really so? Suppose we ask 'Why is the sum of two and two four?
Sosometimes, at least, a request for explaining the truth of p is met in a satisfying way by pointing out that p is necessarily true. Why, then, should we not be satisfied whenindependence foundationalists answer the J-question by saying thatperceptual experiences are necessarily a source ofjustification? To find out whether we should be satisfied, we mightemploy thought experiments. Ifwe can conceive of such a possible world, then we have reason to thinkthat independence foundationalists are mistaken when they say thatperceptual experience is necessarily a source of justification.
Beliefs arise in people for a wide variety of causes. Among them, wemust list psychological factors such as desires, emotional needs,prejudice, and biases of various kinds. For true beliefs to count as knowledge, it is necessary thatthey originate in sources we have good reason to consider reliable.
These are perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony. Letus briefly consider each of these. Our perceptual faculties are our five senses: sight, touch, hearing,smelling, and tasting.
We must distinguish between an experience thatcan be classified as perceiving that p for example,seeing that there is coffee in the cup and tasting that it is sweet ,which entails that p is true, and a perceptual experience inwhich it seems to us as though p , but where p mightbe false.
Let us refer to this latter kind of experience as perceptual seemings. The reason for making this distinctionlies in the fact that perceptual experience is fallible. The world isnot always as it appears to us in our perceptual experiences. We need,therefore, a way of referring to perceptual experiences in which p seems to be the case that allows for the possibility of p being false.
So some perceptual seemings that p are cases ofperceiving that p , others are not. When it looks to you asthough there is a cup of coffee on the table and in fact there is, thetwo states coincide. If, however, you hallucinate that there is a cupon the table, you have perceptual seeming that p withoutperceiving that p. I am a user of this app. Yoga studio software for mac.
One family of epistemological issues about perception arises when weconcern ourselves with the psychological nature of the perceptualprocesses through which we acquire knowledge of external objects. According to direct realism , we can acquire such knowledgebecause we can directly perceive such objects. For example, when yousee a tomato on the table, what you perceive is the tomatoitself.
According to indirect realism , we acquire knowledge ofexternal objects by virtue of perceiving something else, namelyappearances or sense-data.
An indirect realist would say that, when yousee and thus know that there is a tomato on the table, what you reallysee is not the tomato itself but a tomato-like sense-datum or some suchentity. Direct and indirect realists hold different views about thestructure of perceptual knowledge. Indirect realists would say that weacquire perceptual knowledge of external objects by virtue ofperceiving sense data that represent external objects. Sense data, aspecies of mental states, enjoy a special status: we know directly whatthey are like.
So indirect realists think that, when perceptualknowledge is foundational, it is knowledge of sense data and othermental states. Knowledge of external objects is indirect: derived fromour knowledge of sense data. The basic idea is that we have indirectknowledge of the external world because we can have foundationalknowledge of our own mind. Direct realists can be more liberal aboutthe foundation of our knowledge of external objects.
Since they holdthat perceptual experiences get you in direct contact with externalobjects, they can say that such experiences can give you foundationalknowledge of external objects. We take our perceptual faculties to be reliable. But how can we knowthat they are reliable? For externalists, this might not be much of achallenge.
If the use of reliable faculties is sufficient forknowledge, and if by using reliable faculties we acquire the beliefthat our faculties are reliable, then we come to know that ourfaculties are reliable. But even externalists might wonder how theycan, via argument, show that our perceptual faculties arereliable. The problem is this. It would seem the only way of acquiringknowledge about the reliability of our perceptual faculties is throughmemory, through remembering whether they served us well in the past.
But should I trust my memory, and should I think that the episodes ofperceptual success that I seem to recall were in fact episodes ofperceptual success? Through introspection, one knows whatmental states one is in: whether one is thirsty, tired, excited, ordepressed. Compared with perception, introspection appears to have aspecial status. But could it be possible that it introspectively seems to methat I have a headache when in fact I do not?
It is not easy to see howit could be. Thus we come to think that introspection has a specialstatus. Compared with perception, introspection seems to be privilegedby virtue of being less error prone. How can we account for the specialstatus of introspection? First, it could be argued that, when it comes to introspection,there is no difference between appearance and reality; therefore,introspective seemings are necessarily successful introspections.
According to this approach, introspection is infallible. Alternatively,one could view introspection as a source of certainty. Here the idea isthat an introspective experience of p eliminates all possibledoubt as to whether p is true. Finally, one could attempt toexplain the specialness of introspection by examining the way werespond to first-person reports: typically, we attribute a specialauthority to such reports.
According to this approach, introspection isincorrigible. Introspection reveals how the world appears to us in our perceptualexperiences. For that reason, introspection has been of specialinterest to foundationalists. Perception is not immune to error.
Ifcertainty consists in the absence of all possible doubt, perceptionfails to yield certainty. Hence beliefs based on perceptual experiencescannot be foundational. Introspection, however, might deliver what weneed to find a firm foundation for our beliefs about external objects:at best outright immunity to error or all possible doubt, or perhapsmore modestly, an epistemic kind of directness that cannot be found inperception.
Is it really true, however, that, compared with perception,introspection is in some way special? Critics of foundationalism haveargued that introspection is certainly not infallible.
Might one notconfuse an unpleasant itch for a pain? Might I not think that the shapebefore me appears circular to me when in fact it appears slightlyelliptical to me?
If it is indeed possible for introspection tomislead, then it is hard to see why introspection should eliminate allpossible doubt. Introspection, then, turns out to be a mysterious faculty. On theone hand, it does not seem to be in general an infallible faculty; onthe other hand, when looking at appropriately described specific cases,error does seem impossible. Memory is the capacity to retain knowledge acquired in the past.
Whatone remembers, though, need not be a past event. Memory is, of course, fallible. Not everyinstance of taking oneself to remember that p is an instanceof actually remembering that p.
We should distinguish,therefore, between remembering that p which entails the truthof p and seeming to remember that p whichdoes not entail the truth of p.
One issue about memory concerns the question of what distinguishesmemorial seemings from perceptual seemings or mere imagination. The distinctively epistemological questionsabout memory are these: First, what makes memorial seemings a source ofjustification? Is it a necessary truth that, if one has a memorialseeming that p , one has thereby prima facie justification for p? Or is memory a source of justification only if, asexternalists would say, it is in fact reliable?
Second, how can werespond to skepticism about knowledge of the past? Memorial seemings ofthe past do not guarantee that the past is what we take it to be.
Wethink that we are a bit older than just five minutes, but it islogically possible that the world sprang into existence just fiveminutes ago, complete with our dispositions to have memorial seemingsof a more distant past and items such as apparent fossils that suggesta past going back millions of years.
Our seeming to remember that theworld is older than a mere five minutes does not entail, therefore,that it really is. Why, then, should we think that memory is a sourceof knowledge about the past? Some beliefs would appear to be justified solely by the use ofreason.
Justification of that kind is said to be apriori : prior to any kind of experience. A standard way ofdefining a priori justification goes as follows:. What exactly counts as experience? Several important issues arise about a priori knowledge. First, does it exist at all? Skeptics about apriority deny itsexistence. Rather, what theyclaim is that all such knowledge is empirical. Second, if a priori justification is possible, exactly howdoes it come about?
Is it anunmediated grasp of the truth of this proposition? Or does it consistof grasping that the proposition is necessarily true? Or is it, as externalists would suggest, the reliability of thecognitive process by which we come to recognize the truth of such aproposition? Third, if a priori knowledge exists, what is its extent?
Propositions of a superior status, which conveygenuine information about world, are labeled synthetic. Rationalists deny this. Mac os x high sierra download dmg. A fourth question about the nature of a priori knowledgeconcerns the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Thereceived view is that whatever is known a priori isnecessarily true, but there are epistemologists who disagree with that. And when you learn by reading the Washington Post that the terrorist attack in Sharm el-Sheikhof July 22, killed at least 88 people, that, too, is an example ofacquiring knowledge on the basis of testimony.
The epistemological puzzle testimony raises is this: Why istestimony a source of knowledge? An externalist might say thattestimony is a source of knowledge if and only if it comes from areliable source.
But here, even more so than in the case of ourfaculties, internalists will not find that answer satisfactory. Suppose further thatperson is in fact utterly reliable with regard to the question ofwhether p is the case or not. But if the reliabilityof a testimonial source is not sufficient for making it a source ofknowledge, what else is needed?
Thomas Reid suggested that, by our verynature, we accept testimonial sources as reliable and tend to attributecredibility to them unless we encounter special contrary reasons. What is it that makes that attitude reasonable? An alternative to the track record approach wouldbe to declare it a necessary truth that trust in testimonial sources isjustified.
This suggestion, alas, encounters the same difficulty as theexternalist approach to testimony: it does not seem we can acquireknowledge from sources the reliability of which is utterly unknown to us. According to skeptics, the limits of what you know are narrower thanyou would like to think. There are many things that you think you knowbut actually fail to know. How can the skeptics expect you totake such a strange conclusion seriously?
They direct your attention to what is called a skeptical hypothesis. According to a skeptical hypothesis,things are radically different from what you take them to be.
Here areseveral examples:. This works better for some than forothers. It works really well for the BIV hypothesis, which we discussedalready in section 2. The idea is that, if you are a BIV, you arereduced to a mere brain which is stimulated in such a way that thedelusion of a normal life results. So the experiences you have as a BIVand the experiences you have as a normal person are perfectly alike,indistinguishable, so to speak, 'from the inside. After all, you can seethat you have a body, and you can freely move about in yourenvironment.
The problem is that it looks that way to a BIV, too. As aresult, the evidence you have as a normal person and the evidence youhave as a BIV do not relevantly differ.
Let us now focus on the second step. Thatthought is extremely plausible. After all, if you are a BIV, you don'thave any hands. As we have just seen, 1 and 2 are very plausible premises. Itwould seem, therefore, that the BIV Argument is sound. So we are confronted with a difficult challenge: Onwhat grounds can we reject the conclusion of this seemingly sound argument? The second premise is closely connected to the principle thatknowledge is closed under known entailment, for short, the closureprinciple.
Setting complications aside, it says the following:. This principle is exceedingly plausible. Suppose you had exactly two beers. Your having hadexactly two beers entails that you had less than three beers. If youknow both of these things, then you know that you had less than threebeers.
This much, certainly, seems beyond dispute. How is the closure principle related to the skeptical argument? Making these replacements, we get the following application of theclosure principle to the BIV argument:. So the consequent of BIV closure is false. Therefore, theantecedent of BIV closure must be false. The antecedent of BIV closureis a conjunction. If follows that the antecedent ofBIV Closure is false because its first conjunct is false.
Next, we will examine various responses to the BIV argument. According to the first, we should distinguish between relevant andirrelevant alternatives. An alternative to a state of affairs orproposition p is any state of affairs or proposition that isincompatible with p. Your having hands and your being a BIVare alternatives: if the former is true, the latter is false, and viceversa.
According to the thought that motivates the second premise ofthe BIV argument, you know that you have hands only if you candiscriminate between your actually having hands and the alternative ofbeing a handless BIV.
Inresponse to such reasoning, a relevant alternatives theorist would saythat your inability to discriminate between these two states of affairsis not an obstacle to your knowing that you have hands because yourbeing a BIV is not a relevant alternative to yourhaving hands. What would be a relevant alternative? This, for example:your arms ending in stumps rather than hands, or your having hooksinstead of hands, or your having prosthetic hands. Therelevant alternative theorist holds, therefore, that you do know thatyou have hands.
The BIV argument is valid. Relevant alternative theorists musttherefore deny one of its premises. Since they agree that you don'tknow that your are not a BIV, they accept the first premise. Consequently, they reject the second premise. This means, ineffect, that relevant alternative theorists deny the closure principle. Relevant alternativetheorists say:. Relevant alternative theorists, then, assert the antecedent and denythe consequent of BIV closure, as stated in the previous section.
Theyare, therefore, committed to the claim that the closure principle is false. There are two chief problems for this approach. The first is thatdenouncing the BIV alternative as irrelevant is ad hoc unlessit is supplemented with a principled account of what makes onealternative relevant and another irrelevant.
The second is that theclosure principle enjoys a high degree of intrinsic plausibility. Denying it generates so-called abominable conjunctions. Here isone:. Moore has pointed out that an argument succeeds only to theextent that its premises are more plausible than the conclusion. According to this approach, we can respond to theBIV argument as follows:.
Unless we are skeptics or opponents of closure, we would have toconcede that this argument is sound. It is valid, and its premises aretrue. What needs to be accomplishedis more than a mere assertion of 3 , based on knowledge of one'shands. What we need to have explained to us is how one canknow that one is not a BIV. We have looked at two responses to the BIV argument. The relevantalternatives response denies the second premise.
Because of theplausibility of the second premise, this might strike us as adesperation move. The Moorean response denies the first premise. What so varies is what we mean bythat word. Three questions arise immediately. Let us consider each question inturn. Xtranormal movie maker free download. We will thenascribe knowledge liberally. Meetingthese is very difficult.
In such contexts, we will ascribe knowledgeonly reluctantly. According to some contextualists, it is thesalience of error-possibilities.
As a result, your standards of knowledge remain low. In such acontext, all it takes for you to know you have hands is that you candiscriminate between having hands and having stumps, hooks, orprosthetic hands. Hence you willnot be reluctant at all to ascribe to yourself knowledge of your hands.
But suppose you start thinking about the problem of skepticism. You'rewondering how you could know that you are not a BIV. The BIValternative is now salient to you. This makes your standards ofknowledge rise. The site is non-commercial and we are not able to check all user posts. Size: Wolfschanze 2. Fall of the Thi. Company of Heroes Eastern Fron.
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